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FAIR HEARING IN ADMINISTRATIVE
RULE-MAKING: A RECENT EXPERIENCE UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD,
DRUG AND COSMETIC AND FAIR
PACKAGING AND LABELING ACTS
WESLEY E. FORTE*

In promulgatingregulationsto govern the labeling of foods under
the FairPackaging and Labeling Act, the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs, despite the objections of adversely affected parties,
denied all requests for a public hearing. In this article-the author
reviews the hearing provisions of the Act, analyzes the position
taken by the Food and Drug Administration, and concludes that
the failure'to grant a trial-type hearingon the labeling regulations
was legally indefensible.

P

ROBABLY the most controversial topic in food and drug law
during the 1960's has been the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act.
The first Fair Packaging and Labeling bill was introduced in 1962,1
following extensive investigative hearings by the Senate Antitrust
and Monopoly Subcommittee. 2 The congressional hearings held
from 1963 to 1966 provided ample opportunity for expression by
both proponents and opponents of the legislation. 3 Despite the
extensive congressional hearings, Congress in the provision finally
adopted4 did not generally specify standards for the labeling of con* B.B.A. 1956, Clark University; LL.B. 1959, LL.M. (Trade Reg.) 1965, New York
University; Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. The author is a member of the corporate law department of the Borden Company, a major food processor. The views contained in this article, however, are solely the personal views of the author.
1 See S. 3745, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
See Hart, Can Federal Legislation Affecting Consumers' Economic Interests Be
Enacted?, 64 Micr. L. REv. 1255, 1257 (1966).
Old. at 1257-58.
'15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. II, 1967). The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act
of 1966 was intended to enable consumers to obtain accurate information as to the net
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sumer commodities in the Act, but rather, merely authorized the
Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Trade Commission
to fix these requirements and prohibitions in administrative regulations.5 The Commissioner of Food and Drugs, upon publication of
proposed regulations on March 17, 1967, solicited comments concerning his proposals.1 Over 300 comments were filed;8 the Commissioner modified his regulations and re-published the amended
provisions9 as required by law. 10 Persons adversely affected were
given 30 days to file objections and requests for a public hearing."1
quantity of contents of consumer commodities and to facilitate value comparisons. See
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. II, 1967). It provided generally that it was illegal to distribute a packaged consumer commodity in
interstate commerce unless the commodity was labeled in conformity with regulations
which provide for a statement of the name and place of business of the manufacturer,
packer, or distributor, a uniform location for the net weight statement of the commodity, and uniform type sizes for the net contents statements on packages of commodities of substantially the same size. Id. § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 1453 (Supp. II, 1967).
The Act also authorized certain discretionary regulations. Id. § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1454
(Supp. IL 1967). However, no discretionary regulations have been yet promulgated.
r The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare was given authority to promulgate regulations governing foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, and the Federal Trade
Commission was given authority to promulgate regulations governing all other consumer commodities. Fair Packaging and Labeling Act § 5 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1454 (a)
(Supp. II, 1967). Since most consumer commodities not exempted by the Act are
foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, the greater burden of regulation was placed on
the Food and Drug Administration (acting under the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare) rather than the FTC. The scope of the FTC's authority is not yet
dear, although that authority certainly includes detergents and paper napkins.
The extent of the FTC's authority may be defined more precisely in its revised regulations which are still unpublished.
832 Fed. Reg. 4172 (1967).
The Federal Trade Commission also published proposed regulations under the Act. 32 Fed. Reg. 9109-12 (1967).
7 Section 6 (a) of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1455 (a) (Supp.
II, 1967), describes the procedure the FDA must follow in promulgating regulations.
The Act directs that both the Food and Drug Administration's and the Federal Trade
Commission's regulations be promulgated subject to judicial review in conformity with
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act §§ 701 (e)- (g), 21 U.S.C. §§ 371 (e). (g) (1964).

Congress expressly recognized in the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act that hearing
could be required under this procedure when it stated that hearings "authorized or
required" for the promulgation of the regulations could be held before an officer designated by the Secretary or the Commission. See Fair Packaging and Labeling Act § 6,

15 U.S.C. § 1455 (Supp. II, 1967).
8 32 Fed. Reg. 10729 (1967).
8

Id. at 10729-34.
20 The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act requires that the FDA's regulations be
promulgated pursuant to the provisions of subsections (e), (f), and (g) of § 701 of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 371 (e)- (g) (1964). Section 701 (c)(1)
requires the republication of the regulations as a "proposed order." 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e)

(1) (1964).
"I See 32 Fed. Reg. 10729, 10733 (1967). This procedure is required by § 701 (e) (2) of
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (2) (1964), and § 6 (a) of
the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1455 (a) (Supp. II, 1967).
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Almost 50 communications were received by the Commissioner in
response to the republication some of which requested a public hearing.12 The Commissioner considered the objections, made a few
minor amendments, and denied all requests for a public hearing. 13
Thus, although all interested persons had been given a full and fair
opportunity to state their views concerning the proposed legislation in
oral testimony before Congress, the same opportunity was not made
available to them when the regulations were promulgated by the
Commissioner of Food and Drugs. The regulations, not the Act,
prescribed the specific labeling requirements for consumer commodities and the Commissioner's refusal to grant a public hearing
on the labeling requirements has been the subject of wide criticism
in the food industry. 14
Tim

RIGHT TO A

TRImL-TYPE

HEARING UNDER THE

ACT

It is well established that there is no constitutional right to a
hearing when an administrative agency is engaged in rule-making.'5
As Mr. Justice Holmes has stated:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is
impracticable that everyone should have a direct vote in its adopttion. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done
in town meeting or an assembly of the whole.16
However, section 701 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 17which is, in effect, incorporated in the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act' 8-has heretofore been regarded as the outstanding example of a
statute which compels the use of trial techniques, including a hearing
with testimony and cross-examination, in rule-making.' 9 The Commissioner's virtually unprecedented action 20 in denying a public
12 82 Fed. Reg. 13277 (1967).
1
8 See id.
",See, e.g., Burditt, Fair Packagingand Labeling-The Cost to Consumers, 22 FooD
DRUG Cos r. L.J. 542, 545-46 (1967).
Ir See, e.g., Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 694 (9th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1950); T. CHRISTOPHER, CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS IN FOOD
AND DRUG LAWS 22 (1960); 1 K. DAVIS, AD

NsmATrvE LAW TREATISE § 7.06 (1958).

Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 445 (1915).
1721 U.S.C. §371 (1964).
See Fair Packaging and Labeling Act § 6 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1455 (a) (Supp. II, 1967).
20 1 K. DAvis, supra note 15, § 6.06.
20 The closest precedents appear to be Dyestuffs & Chems., Inc. v. Flemming, 271
F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 862 U.S. 911 (1960); Cook Chocolate Co. v. Miller
10

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1968: 1

hearing deserves detailed review because it is apparently a significant
change in the procedures followed by the Food and Drug Administration. Since few litigated cases have considered the right to a public
hearing in rule-making under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, such a review must rest primarily upon the legislative history of
the Act.
The legislative history of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act of 1938 includes extensive debates on the procedure for promulgating regulations. Congress believed it was very important that a
trial-type hearing be held before a regulation became effective. The
bill recommended to the House of Representatives by its Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce provided that: "The Secretary,
on his own initiative or at the request of any interested industry or
substantial portion thereof, shall hold a public hearing upon a proposal to issue, amend, or repeal any regulation ....-21 Further, the
Secretary was to base his decision on the proposed regulation only
upon substantial evidence of record presented at the hearing and the
order was to contain detailed findings of fact based upon that evi22
dence.
The House Report which accompanied this bill stated:
A proposal to issue, amend, or repeal any such regulation is to
be made by the Secretary of Agriculture on his own initiative, or by
the interested industry or a substantial portion thereof, and the
Secretary is required to set the proposal for hearing....
This will prevent the pocketing of proposals to issue, amend, or
repeal a particular regulation and eliminate application of the
'negative order' doctrine which denies court relief where the executive officer merely fails to take any affirmative action.
If as a result of the hearing on any proposal, the Secretary determines to issue, amend, or repeal the regulation, the action taken
may be based only on substantial evidence of record at the hearing.
Similarly, the action of the Secretary in failing to carry into effect
any proposal for issuance, amendment, or repeal of a regulation
set for hearing must rest on a like basis. In either instance detailed
(D.D.C. April 1950), reported in V. KLEINFELD 8- C. DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUO AND
CosMTvc ACr-JuDicuL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 1949-50, at 251 (1951) (judgment
for the administrator); Cook Chocolate Co. v. Miller, 72 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1947)
(motion to dismiss denied). These cases are reviewed at text accompanying notes 34.49
infra.
21 S. 5, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. § 701 (e) (1938) (emphasis supplied) (reprinted in C.
DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG AND COsMETIc Acr-A STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD

793, 810 (1938)).
2 See id.
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findings of the facts on which the action of the Secretary is based
are required to be made public as a part of his order. It follows
that if the order of the Secretary is to be valid, the Government
must have placed in the record at the hearing its evidence in support of the action taken and thereby afford opportunity for pergons
affected to controvert viva voce the Government's evidence. While
common law or jury trial rules of evidence need not be enforced
at such a hearing, nevertheless it is essential to such a hearing that
all the evidence on which the administrative officer acts be disclosed
at the hearing and that the right to controvert viva voce be ac23
corded.
In support of the above quotation, the House of Representatives
in its report cited a then-current Supreme Court case, 24 Ohio Bell
Telephone Company v. Public Utilities Commission,25 which illustrates the type of hearing and findings of fact intended by Congress.
The Ohio Bell case began with a proceeding to revise telephone rate
schedules. One of the key issues in the proceeding was to determine
the fair value of Ohio Bell's property. The Public Utilities Commission determined the value of the telephone company's property
as of a certain date and then took judicial notice of published price
trends and other material which it used to adjust the valuation for
other years. On appeal, the principal issue was whether the Public
Utilities Commission had denied the telephone company a fair hearing by taking judicial notice of price indices and other evidence
outside the official record. The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the
Public Utilities Commission and the United States Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that: "The fundamentals of a -trial were
denied to the appellant when rates previously collected were ordered
to be refunded upon the strength of evidential facts not spread upon
the record." 2 6 The Supreme Court also held that the proceedings
were subject to another objection:
From the standpoint of due process-the protection of the individual against arbitrary action-a deeper vice is this, that even now
we do not know the particular or evidential facts of which the Coin2

3H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) (reprinted in C. DUNN, supra
note 21, at 815, 824).
2

'See id.
-C301 U.S. 292 (1937).
Id.at 300.

20
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mission took judicial notice and on which it rested its conclusion.
Not only are the facts unknown; there is no way to find them
out....
[H]ow was it possible for the appellate court to review the law
and the facts and intelligently decide that the findings of the Commission were supported by the evidence when the evidence that
it approved was unknown and unknowable?27
While Congress believed it was essential that a hearing be given
before the promulgation of any regulation and that the regulation be
based only upon evidence presented at a hearing, Congress also feared
that industry would submit an endless succession of repetitive proposals to amend regulations, thereby keeping the Secretary in useless
and perpetual public hearings. A group of consumer organizations
protested that the provision making it mandatory for the Secretary
to go through the whole process of public hearings whenever an
industry is dissatisfied with a regulation was completely unjustified
and likely to hamper enforcement activities.2 8 A minority report
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce noted
that:
If... any substantial proportion of such manufacturers, demanded
a public hearing on a proposal to amend or repeal a regulation
previously validated by the courts after litigation under subsection
(f), the Secretary would have no alternative but to hold such a
hearing ....
In most of the industries affected by the bill there are sufficient
minorities, vociferously opposed to any form of regulation, to form
a substantial proportion of the industry. These could be depended
upon in practically every instance in which a regulation is required
for the protection of public welfare to resort to the tactics above
described and prevent indefinitely the effectuation of the purpose
29
of the law.
2Id. at 302-03.
28 See C. DUNN, supra note 21, at 750. Senator Copeland, sponsor of the bill in the
Senate, had this statement inserted in the Record immediately following the Senate's
passage of the bill. Id. at 746.
2' See H.R. REP. No. 2139, supra note 28. The House bill contained a provision
stating that within ninety days after the Secretary issued a regulation, any person
adversely affected could seek to enjoin the Secretary from enforcing the provision
in any district court in the United States. C. DUNN, supra note 21, at 810. There-
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Representative Lea felt that the bill deprived the Secretary of all
discretionary powers. He therefore offered an amendment 30 to allow
the Secretary, on his own initiative, "or upon an application of any

interested industry or substantial portion thereof statingreasonable
grounds therefor,"al to hold a public hearing upon a proposal to
issue, amend, or repeal any regulation, and it was so enacted into
law.3 2
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act's rule-making pro-

cedure thus followed two fundamental principles:
1. Proposals for rule-making which were initiated by industry
and were not supported by reasonable grounds could be denied by

the Secretary without a public hearing;
2. Proposals for rule-making which were initiated by the Secretary, or initiated by industry and supported by reasonable grounds,
had to be given a public hearing, and could only become effective
after the Secretary had made detailed findings of fact based upon
evidence presented at that hearing.
Under this procedure, no regulation could ever be made effective

without first having been the subject of a public hearing.33 The
initial litigation concerning the right to a public hearing, Cook
4 involved the first
Chocolate Company v. Miller,2
of these prinfore, by continuing to advance repetitive proposals, industry could have prolonged
delay of enforcement of the regulation and kept the Secretary perpetually involved
in either public hearings or injunction proceedings.
0 83 CONG. Rac. 7776 (1938) (remarks of Representative Lea). The Food and Drug
Administration in Cook Chocolate Co. v. Miller, 72 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1947), later
tried to argue from Representative Lea's words that the FDA was given absolute discretion to determine when public hearings should be called and that the exercise of
this discretion could not be reviewed. See Levine, The Cook Chocolate Case-An Effort
To Compel the Initiation of Administrative Proceedings,4 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.Q. 172,
179 (1949). However, this does not seem to be a fair interpretation of the legislative
history of the Act. See text accompanying notes 40-45 infra. Congress was concerned
about repetitive proposals for rule-making and did not believe the Secretary should
be compelled to hold public hearings on such matters. Hence, Congress did not want
to deprive the Secretary of all discretionary powers. However, there is no evidence
that Congress intended to give the Secretary absolute discretion; indeed, with the
exception of repetitive proposals or proposals not sponsored by a substantial portion
of industry, the evidence indicates that a public hearing was regarded as a necessity.
"' 83 CONG. RFc. 7899 (1938) (remarks of Representative Lea) (emphasis added).
32 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 701 (e), 52 Stat. 1055 (1938), as amended,
21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (1964).
"I See ATTORNEY GENRERAL's MANUAL ON THE ADMiNiSTRATnv PROCEDURE Acr 32-33
(1947); Austern, The Formulation of Mandatory Food Standards,2 FooD DRUG. Cosm.
L.Q. 532, 574 (1947); Markel, Reviewing Food Standards, 6 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 191,
201 (1951); Developments in the Law-The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 67
HARv. L. REV. 632, 666-68 (1954).
84 72 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1947).
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ciples-whether a proposal was supported by reasonable grounds and
was therefore entitled to -a public hearing. The plaintiff, Cook
Chocolate Company, had proposed an amendment to the standard of
identity for cholocate which would permit the fortification of this
food with vitamins, alleging in support of its proposed amendment
that the British Ministry of Food had announced that chocolate was
the best medium for administering vitamin concentrates and that
the United States Army and Red Cross had used substantial quantities of vitamin-enriched chocolate to maintain proper diets of soldiers
and under-nourished persons. The Federal Security Administrator
refused to hold a public hearing on the proposal, saying it was not
supported by reasonable grounds, and the Cook Chocolate Company
sought a declaratory judgment to compel the hearing. 5
The Government's motion to dismiss the complaint was overruled. 6 A court hearing was held thereafter and the company failed
to prove the facts alleged in its petition to amend the chocolate
standard. 7 In light of the company's failure, the court held that
the Administrator's refusal to grant a hearing was not arbitrary or
8
illegal.3
The reasoning underlying the Cook Chocolate case was not very
satisfactory to either the Food and Drug Administration or industry.
The Administration apparently believed that the power to call a
public hearing is discretionary and that the denial of a public hearing because the petition is not supported by reasonable grounds cannot be reviewed by any court.39 The FDA's argument was based
on Representative Lea's words in offering the reasonable-grounds
amendment to the House bill:40
The bill provides that on the request of an industry or a substantial portion of it the Secretary shall hold a hearing. The
authorities of the Department of Agriculture objected to this
1r The Cook Chocolate Company also sought a declaratory judgment that its chocolate with vitamins was not barred by standards of identity which did not permit the
use of vitamins in chocolate. However, this was held not to be a proper subject for
declaratory judgment. Id. at 574.
$0Id.
11 Cook Chocolate Co. v. Miller (D.D.C. April 1950), reported in V. KLEINF=_n & C.

DuNN, supra note 20, at 251.
38 Id. at 252.
81See Levine, supra note
0

1d. at 180.

30, at

172.

Vol. 1968: 1]

ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING

provision, claiming that it deprived the Secretary of all discretionary powers.
I shall offer an amendment at the proper time providing in substance that when reasonable cause is shown the Secretary shall
41
call the hearing. This will obviate any dispute over that question.
The FDA reasoned that the dispute about hearings was obviated by
giving the Secretary complete discretion to determine whether a
hearing should be granted.
However, it is difficult to reconcile this conclusion with the remainder of Representative Lea's comments. Immediately preceding
the words relied upon by the FDA, Representative Lea said:
I wanted to call the attention of the House to the particular
regulations that are affected by this court review, but on account
of the limited time I will not at this time enumerate those powers.
For the present it is sufficient to say that they are very broad and
very important. It is these broad powers that no man should seek
or want to exercise unless the court has a reasonableright to review
his conduct from the standpoint of arbitrary action.4
In the same speech, the Congressman stated:
[W]e must not ignore the fact that the people deserve protection
against arbitrary and capricious government, against inexperience
and ignorance by the departments which exercise this semilegislative authority.48
Therefore, considering Representative Lea's comments in their
entirety, it seems likely that he intended to permit court review of
the denial of a public hearing. Such a conclusion is consistent with
4
the other legislative history in the House " and with the words of
the statute to the effect that if reasonable grounds are shown, the
Secretary shall call a public hearing. 45 The court in Cook Chocolate
,"L83 CONG. REG. 7776 (1938) (remarks of Representative Lea).
421d. (emphasis added).

"Id.

See also Salthe, Food Standard Making-What Did Congress Intend?, 6

FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 174, 176 (1951): "Congress did not intend to delegate to the

Secretary the same latitude that it exercises in enacting a law.... Congress intended
to guard against any arbitrary action on the part of the Secretary in the promulgation
of standards."
4See text accompanying notes 23-33 supra.
4Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 701 (e), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (1964); cf.
Developments in the Law-The FederalFood, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 67 H-Iv. L. R-v.
632, 668 n.283 (1954) (stating that it is arguable the statute compels such review).
Quite apart from the merits of the Cook Chocolate case, the FDA's denial of a public
hearing was regarded by one authority as an extraordinarily undesirable and unwise ad-
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clearly did, in fact, review the denial of the hearing to determine
whether it was an abuse of discretion.40
The Cook Chocolate case was not very satisfactory to industry
because the plaintiff was given his opportunity to prove the facts
underlying his petition in court rather than before the Secretary.
In its ruling, the court seems to have failed to consider fully the
nature of a public hearing. A public hearing is not a confrontation
between the plaintiff and the Secretary; it is a proceeding at which
all interested persons can offer evidence.4 7 Thus, if the plaintiff's
grounds were prima facie reasonable, the court erred in dismissing
the complaint because it was at least possible that other interested
persons would have appeared at the hearing and offered evidence
supporting the plaintiff's arguments. Furthermore, in dismissing the
complaint because of the absence of "competent evidence" to support the asserted grounds, the court may have overlooked the fact
that evidentiary rules are much more informal at administrative hearings than in judicial proceedings.- s Administrative agencies have
wide discretion in the admission of evidence and other procedural
matters; therefore, a possibility also existed that the plaintiff's evidence would have been competent to support his assertions had the
hearing been before the Secretary rather than the court. In short,
a denial of a public hearing is similar to the dismissal of a complaint,
ministrative determination. Austern, Section 403(g) Revisited, 6 FooD DRuG CosM.
L.J. 181, 183 (1951).
"Cook Chocolate Co. v. Miller (D.D.C. April 1950), reported in V. KLEINFEL & C.
DUNN, supra note 20, at 251. A contrary conclusion would have placed excessive power
over the food industry in the hands of the FDA. Some regulations define the composition of foods which cannot be sold except under the label "imitation." See Forte,
Definitions and Standards of Identity for Foods, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 796 (1967). By
refusing to permit amendments to these regulations, the Secretary could arbitrarily
freeze the composition of all foods and preclude all future improvements. These were
probably the very broad powers which would have concerned Representative Lea were
they not subject to judicial review. See text accompanying note 42 supra. The regulations are the same type as those involved in the Cook Chocolate case. Hence,
where a clear abuse of discretion can be shown, the courts should order a hearing since
a contrary approach could deny the public a significantly improved food product.
Developments In the Law-The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARv. L.

REv. 632, 668 (1954).

17The statute itself so provides.

See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act

§ 701 (e) (3), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (3) (1964).
48 See Cook Chocolate Co. v. Miller (D.D.C. April 1950), reported in V. KJ.EINEELD &
C. DUNN, supra note 20, at 252. The dismissal of the complaint apparently resulted
from a procedural tangle in which the plaintiff succeeded in getting his petition and
supporting documents introduced but did not have a witness qualified to testify
concerning their contents. The complaint was later dismissed when the documents
were found not to be competent evidence. Levine, supra note 30, at 175-76.

Vol. 1968: 1)

ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING

and if the grounds in the petition are reasonable, the hearing should

49
be held before the administrative agency rather than the court.

In the late 1940's and early 1950's, it became apparent that the
excessive formality of the rule-making procedures of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act impeded the issuance of non-controversial regulations.50 The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law Section of
the New York State Bar Association, therefore, sponsored an amendment to reform the procedures for promulgating FDA definitions
of the composition of foods. Endorsed by both food manufacturers and the Secretary,51 the proposed amendment was patterned
52
after section 507 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Among the more important changes the amendment made in the
procedure for promulgating regulations defining foods were the
following:
1. The Secretary or any interested person showing reasonable
grounds therefor could propose a regulation. 53 Under the prior
procedure, regulations had to be initiated by the Secretary or a substantial portion of an industry. The 1938 Act had been interpreted
to permit only basic food manufacturers and fabricators to propose
amendments, while manufacturers and sellers of ingredients for
foods could not suggest such changes, 4 The amendment thus
40 Cf. Levine, supra note 30, at 181: "The issues raised by the complaint were
essentially legal, not factual, and the so-called trial seemed particularly inappropriate
for their determination." See also Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 1009
(1964), providing that except so far as statutes preclude judicial review, or agency action is by law committed to agency discretion, judicial review is available. Recent
decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that judicial review will not be denied
unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress. See
Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967); cf. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADAINISTRATIVE AG cIEs 863
(1965) ("Presumptively, an exercise of discretion is reviewable for legal error, procedural defect, or 'abuse.' ").
60 See, e.g., Markel, supra note 83, at 191. See also Goodrich, Patchwork on a
Crazy Quilt of Administrative Procedures, 10 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 604, 606-07 (1955).
5
2 See 1954 FDA ANNUAL REPORT, reprinted in V. KLEINFELD & C. DUNN, FEDERAL
FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETIC Acr-JuDIcIAL AND ADmINISTRATIVE RECORD, 1953-1957, at 664,
681 (1958). See also Markel, Proposed Simplification of Food Standards Procedures,
8 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 227, 236 (1953) (reporting the action of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Law Section of the New York State Bar Association).
"21 U.S.C. § 357 (1964); see Markel, Reviewing Food Standards, 6 FooD DRUG
Cosm. L.J. 191, 202-03 (1951).
"' See 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (1964).
54 See S. RE,. No. 1060, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) (reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
See also Hearings on HR. 5055 Before a Subcomm.
CONG. & AD. NEws 2126, 2128).
of the House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1953);

12
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broadened the class of members of the food industry who could
propose regulations. 55
2. The revised procedure gave the Secretary an initial opportunity
to determine industry's reaction to a proposed regulation before
public hearings. Regulations proposed under the 1938 Act were
published prior to a public hearing. Under the revised procedure,
a suggested regulation was published; interested persons were given
an opportunity to state their views; and, finally, the Secretary proposed an order to which all adversely affected parties could file specific objections and request a public hearing.5 6 Thus, if a public
hearing were held, the Secretary knew from the objections which
portions of his order were disputed and what the grounds for the
57
dispute were.
3. The revised procedure eliminated public hearings on nonUnder prior procedures, all regulacontroversial regulations.5
tions, even those to which there was no opposition, were given a
formal public hearing at which the Food and Drug Administration
presented evidence to support each portion. The requirement that
the Secretary make detailed findings of fact substantiating the suggested provisions resulted in a record for judicial review even on
minor amendments. 59 Under the revised procedure, hearings and
detailed findings of fact were eliminated when no objection was
raised to the proposed regulation.
The proposed amendment, called the Hale Amendment, was enacted in 1954,60 thereby revising the statutory procedure so far as
standards of identity for foods were concerned. In 1956 a statutory
addition to the Hale Amendment was enacted which extended the
new procedure to all FDA regulations. 61
While the Hale Amendments were intended to permit the SecreMarkel, Proposed Simplification of Food Standards Procedures, 8 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J.
227, 234 (1953).
as See S. REP. No. 1060, supra note 54.
U'See Act of April 15, 1954, ch. 143, § 1, 68 Stat. 54, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e)

(1964).
7 As noted in the House hearings, the bill gave the basic industry an opportunity to
be heard at the initial stages of rule-making. See Hearings on H.R. 5055, supra note
54, at 12.
58 See Markel, Proposed Simplification of Food Standards Procedures, 8 FOOD DRUG
Cosm. L.J. 227, 235-36 (1953).
GoSee S. REP. No. 1060, supra note 54.
00 Act of April 15, 1954, ch. 143, § 1, 68 Stat. 55.
e1Act of August 1, 1956, ch. 861, §2, 70 Stat. 919.
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tary to forego public hearings on noncontroversial regulations, it is
perfectly clear that they were not intended to eliminate these sessions
when a party desired to make a record for judicial review. Support
for this interpretation is found in the 1954 House Hearings, wherein
the representative of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law Section of
the New York State Bar Association, who was virtually the only
witness, testified that in his understanding, the bill would allow any
party to demand a hearing. 62 Further, in 1954 the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare wrote to the House Committee,
stating:
The bill would greatly facilitate noncontroversial changes in food
standards regulations. It would eliminate the necessity for public
hearings and the establishment of a record of testimony and exhibits where, after due notice, it developed no one opposed the
change. 63
The Senate report similarly stated that enactment of the bill would
eliminate the requirement for formal hearings except where such
a hearing was desired for the purpose of providing a basis for judicial
review when the objecting party found the ultimate regulation still
objectionable."
The 1956 legislative history was equally dear. As stated by the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare:
On the narrow issues about which there is controversy, any interested person affected by a proposed regulation could, by filing a
petition, initiate the formal procedure, including a public hearing,
establishment of the public record on which our action would be
based, and review of our action in the United States Courts of
Appeal. Thus, no substantial rights of any person would be
relieved of protection, while government, the public and industry
are relieved of the costs and expenditures of time in holding hearings on points about which we all agree. 65
Likewise, the Senate report on the 1956 amendment stated that
where the proposed regulations were not controversial, the bill would
66
remove mandatory following of formal rule-making procedures.
Thus, in supporting the Hale Amendments, industry still believed
02 See Hearings on H.R. 5055, supra note 54, at 7.
3This letter is part of S. REP. No. 1060, supra note 54.
"1See S. REP. No. 1060, supra note 54.
0 This letter is part of S. REp. No. 2752, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (reprinted in
1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4105-06).
00 See id.
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that it had retained the right to a public hearing whenever any member found a proposed regulation objectionable.
In 1959, Dyestuffs & Chemicals, Incorporatedv. Flemming 7 first
considered the sufficiency of objections and requests for a public
hearing under the Hale Amendments. The Commissioner of Food
and Drugs had issued a prohibition of the unrestricted use of certain
coal-tar colors on the ground that these colors were not "harmless"
as required by law. Regulations governing coal-tar colors were then
promulgated under section 406 of the Act, 8 and these regulations
were subject to the section 70169 procedure as revised by the Hale
Amendments. The petitioner, Dyestuffs & Chemicals, Inc., filed
objections and demanded a public hearing on the proposed regulation, alleging that the colors were harmless under their intended
conditions of use. When the petitioner's request for a public hearing
was denied, it sought to have the regulations set aside by the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. After the filing of the petitioner's
objections, the Supreme Court decided the case of Flemming v.
Florida CitrusExchange,70 in which it held that unless coal-tar colors
were harmless, they were not to be certified. Further, the court held
that the Secretary did not have the power to license the use of coaltar colors on the basis of the varying tolerances for harmful contents.71 This controverted Dyestuffs' primary basis for its hearing
request-that the colors were not harmful in the amounts in which
they were being used, atlhough they were harmful in greater
amounts.7 2 The circuit court reasoned that a public hearing was
unnecessary since even if the petitioner prevailed on his issues, the
Secretary's order would still have to be valid under the Supreme
Court's decision in Florida Citrus.7 The Dyestuffs case thus turned
upon the point that the petitioner had not asserted legally valid
issues concerning the propriety of the Secretary's regulation.
07271 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 862 U.S. 911 (1960).
68 See Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 502, 52 Stat. 1049.
In 1960 Congress enacted
the Color Additive Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act which
now govern regulations similar to those involved in the Dyestuffs case. See Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 706, 21 U.S.C. § 376 (1964).
6821

U.S.C. § 371 (1964).

10 358 U.S. 153 (1958).
71
1d. at 163-67.
72 See Dyestuffs & Chems., Inc. v. Flemming, 271 F.2d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 862 U.S. 911 (1960), in which petitioner's objections are in part reprinted.
The7 objections admit that the colors are harmful when used in sufficient quantity.
3 Id. at 285-86.
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In reviewing Dyestuffs, it becomes apparent that the court explicitly placed only two limitations on the right to a public hearing:
1. The objections must raise issues material to the legality of
the order involved; and
2. The issues must not be frivolous or inconsequential. 74
The court rested these minimal limitations upon the statute itself,
which provides that the purpose of a public hearing is to receive evi5
dence relevant and material to issues raised by the objections. The
court's unequivocal intent was to avoid the futility of a hearing on
issues which lacked substance.7 6
Even these minimal limitations, however, have a dangerous
potential for misapplication.77 When Congress enacted the Hale
Amendments, it used as its model section 507 of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act 7 8 There was one important departure.
Section 507 requires that both a proposal for a regulation and objections to a regulation be supported by reasonable grounds. While
the Hale Amendments require that proposals for regulations initiated by industry be supported by reasonable grounds, objections need
only state "the grounds therefor." 79 Thus, if an attempt were made
to evaluate the grounds of objections to determine whether they were
"reasonable" or frivolous or inconsequential, the Secretary would
be asserting a power which was presumably deliberately denied to
him by the sponsors of the Hale Amendments.8 0 In short, the
7

'Id. at 286.

7r See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 701 (e) (3), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (3)
(1964).
70 "Where the objections stated and the issues raised thereby are, even if true,
legally insufficient, their effect is a nullity and no objections have been stated. Congress did not intend the governmental agencies created by it to perform useless or unfruitful tasks." Dyestuffs & Chems., Inc. v. Flemming, 271 F.2d 281, 286 (8th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 911 (1960).
77 See 1 K. DAvIS, AD mNISrATRWv LAW TAaTusE § 6.05 (Supp. 1965).
78 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1964); see S. REP. No. 1060, supra note 54; Markel, Reviewing
Food Standards, 6 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 191, 202 (1951).
70 Compare Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 507, 21 U.S.C. § 357 (1964), with
id. § 701 (e) (2), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (2) (1964).
80 Markel, who was one of the chief sponsors of the Hale Amendments and virtually
the only witness to testify in favor of the first Hale Amendment, was dearly aware
of the fact that § 507 of the Act required a statement of reasonable grounds to accompany objections. See Markel, Proposed Simplification of Food Standards Procedures, 8
FOOD DRUG CosA. LJ. 227, 233-34 (1953). The inference is inescapable that the
omission was deliberate. It also seems likely that had the proposed amendment required "reasonable grounds" for a hearing, it would have been resisted by industry.
Industry acquiesced in the Hale Amendments because it still believed it would be
given hearings when it desired.
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Secretary's power is limited to determining whether the issues raised
by objections are material or frivolous or inconsequential. The
grounds stated in support of the issues may not be examined for
reasonableness; they are simply included as a convenience to the
Secretary to aid him in his preparation for the hearing.8 '
The rationale for this distinction would seem to lie in the nature
of the public hearing. Once an issue is raised for public examination, all interested persons can participate and offer evidence. 82
It thus becomes totally irrelevant whether the objector's representations (or "grounds") in support of his objection can alone compel
revision of the Secretary's order. Rather, the question is whether
on the record as a whole-considering the evidence presented by all
interested persons-the order is justified.83 The objector by raising
the issue merely starts the process through which the validity of the
Secretary's order is ultimately decided. 4 When a factual issue is
raised, the Secretary then bears the burden of proving the substantiality of the evidence supporting the regulation.8 5
The distinction between issues and grounds for objections will
often be unimportant because the objector will make substantially
the same allegations in both. The court in such a case can be ex81 The FDA, however, takes the contrary view. Its administrative regulations state:
"Objections must be supported by reasonable grounds, which if true, are adequate to
justify the relief sought." 21 C.F.R. § 2.67 (b) (5) (1967). The FDA would thus by regulation supply the word "reasonable" which was omitted from § 701 of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The difficulty with this approach is that it places
the burden on the objector to allege facts equivalent to proving prima facie invalidity
of the regulation. The legislative history of the Hale Amendments, however, supports
the view that hearings were only eliminated when no one opposed a regulation. See
text accompanying notes 61-67 supra. As Representative Hale stated in the 1956
congressional hearings: "Specifically the bill would do only one thing; it would
eliminate the requirement for formal procedure and a formal record when all concerned are in agreement but would preserve the present procedure [i.e., the necessity of
a hearing] where a hearing is desired by any disagreeing party." Hearings on H.R.
9547 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1956). The "present procedure" did not require objections to
be accompanied by "reasonable grounds" to warrant a hearing.
2 See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 701 (e) (3), 21 U.S.C. § 871 (e) (3)
(1964).
88The test is substantial evidence. See id. § 701, 21 U.S.C. § 371 (1964); Federal
Security Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943). See also Austern, The Formulation of Mandatory Food Standards, 2 FoOD DRUG CosM. L.Q. 532, 582-89 (1947).
8, As Mr. Markel said in the 1953 House hearings: "Under the proposed bill formal
hearings would be limited to issues first clarified and pinpointed by the filing of objections .... " Hearings on H.R. 5055, supra note 54, at 10-11.
8r The Secretary must then prove such evidence as a basis for the detailed findings
of facts required under § 701 (e) (3) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (3) (1964).
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pected to reach the same result in deciding whether the issues are
frivolous or inconsequential that it would reach in deciding whether
the grounds for the objection are reasonable. In other situations,
the distinction can be all-important. For example, assume that a food
standard of identity is proposed which does not permit the use of a
particular ingredient. If a manufacturer who uses this ingredient
seeks a public hearing on the validity of the standard of identity
because it bars his product from sale, he may not be entitled to that
procedure.8 0 If instead he seeks a hearing on the issue of whether
the prohibition of this ingredient is supported by substantial evidence, and thus is reasonable and promotes fair dealing in the interest of consumers, he should be given such a hearing, even if the only
87
"grounds" for his objection are that the standard bars his product.
The Secretary then must prove his "substantial evidence" and the
objector can introduce testimony supporting the representations in
his petition and all other relevant evidence whether or not mentioned in his grounds. In practice, therefore, it may be advisable to
begin by drafting a set of issues which are relevant and material to
the proposed regulation and to state these issues separately from the
grounds when making objections.8 8
While only two limitations on the right to a public hearing were
explicitly stated in the Dyestuffs case, the court's opinion certainly
implied a third limitation-that the issues raised must be issues of
soStandards of identity inherently limit the composition of foods and thus prevent
foods which do not conform to the standards from being sold except possibly as imitations. See Federal Security Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 231-82 (1943);
United States v. 306 Cases Containing Sandford Tomato Catsup, 55 F. Supp. 725
(E.D.N.Y. 1944), affd sub nom. Libby McNeill & Libbly v. United States, 148 F.2d
71 (2d Cir. 1945). See also 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 840 U.S. 593 (1951).
Hence the fact that an individual product will be barred by a standard cannot per se
invalidate a proposed standard of identity, and the issue could be regarded as inconsequential. But sales in volume of a food containing a specific ingredient can give
rise to the inference that consumers expect such an ingredient in a food and therefore
that a contrary standard does not conform to the reasonable expectations of purchasers and consumers as required by law. See Forte, supra note 46, at 805-10.
87The issue of whether an order is supported by substantial evidence should
always satisfy the requisite for a grant of a public hearing. By raising this issue,
the objector demands only to know the evidence relied upon by the Secretary and
asks only that the Secretary make a record which can be judicially reviewed.
88The objections also must show that the proponent will be "adversely affected"
by the Secretary's order, must specify "with particularity" the provisions of the order
deemed objectionable, and must request a public hearing. See Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act § 701 (e) (2), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (2) (1964). Occasionally objections
are filed which do not request a public hearing. These objections probably have no
legal status but may still be helpful in persuading the Commissioner that revisions
of his order are desirable.
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fact rather than pure questions of law if a public hearing is to be
required.8 9 The court apparently reasoned that since the statutory
purpose of the hearing is to receive "evidence," only objections
raising factual issues justify a public hearing. One distinguished
commentator takes a contrary view, reasoning that the statute makes
it mandatory for the Secretary to call a hearing when objections are
filed. 90 However, this view ignores the purpose of a public hearing
and the legislative history of the Act which indicates that the public
hearing was intended to provide a basis for detailed findings of
fact by the Secretary. 91 Under the circumstances, it is very difficult
to conclude that the statute was intended to require the Secretary
to listen to oral arguments by all interested persons on the legal
validity of his regulation.
While the Secretary does not have to listen to oral legal arguments, it should be recognized that some issues of law are factually
based and that a public hearing is required on such questions. For
example, one of the most commonly raised objections to an FDA
regulation is that the proposed regulation is not supported by substantial evidence. Whether the evidence supporting the regulation
is substantial is an issue of law. However, no court could intelligently weigh evidence which was not first established in the record
of the case.9 2 In such situations, a public hearing and detailed findings of fact by the Secretary become a necessity to provide a basis
for judicial review in conformity with section 701 (e) (3) of the Act.0a
Thus, issues of law may or may not require a public hearing depend89 This was dearly implied by the court's opinion, which quoted from Sun Oil
Co. v. FPC, 256 F.2d 233 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 872 (1958): "'The only

benefit that would have inured to Sun by notice and hearing would have been the
privilege of making a legal argument before the Commission. We find no requirement
in the Natural Gas Act for notice and hearing in such a situation."' Dyestuffs &
Chems., Inc. v. Flemming, 271 F.2d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 911

(1960); cf. Certified Color Indus. Comm. v. Secretary, 283 F.2d 622, 625 n.1l, 628 (2d
Cir. 1960).
90 1 K. DAvis, supra note 77, § 6.05.

91 See

Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 701 (e) (3), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (3)

(1964); text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
92 This was the problem which troubled the House of Representatives. As in the
Ohio Bell case, the appellate court cannot determine the validity of the administrative agency's action when the evidence is unknown and unknowable. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
9021 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (3) (1964); see Certified Color Indus. Comm. v. Secretary, 283
F.2d 622, 628 (2d Cir. 1960), for an analogous situation in which a color additive

regulation was set aside because the Secretary had failed to make the necessary underlying factual determination.
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ing upon whether a reviewing court requires a record containing
factual evidence to decide the issue of law intelligently.
Problems arise in determining whether factual evidence is required for judicial review of issues raised by objections. However,
the polar points seem relatively clear. If the issue is whether the
Secretary's action is arbitrary, it is equivalent to asking whether his
action is supported by substantial evidence and a hearing is required.
If the issue is whether the Secretary is within his legal authority,
generally no hearing is required because the reviewing court can
decide that question solely upon the basis of the statute and its legislative history. When it is difficult to determine whether or not
factual issues have been presented, the proper procedure would seem
to be for the Secretary to grant the hearing. Again, this is consistent with the indications in the legislative history of section 701 of
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act that hearings were to be
liberally granted to objectors.9 4 Such a position also recognizes that
no one can predict what evidence will be offered at a public hearing
and, therefore, that the right to offer such evidence should not be
denied unless it is completely clear that there are no conceivable facts
which would be beneficial to a decision.
From a policy, as well as a legal, viewpoint, it can be reasoned that
the Secretary should be liberal in granting public hearings on close
questions. A contrary approach raises the possibility of protracted
litigation to determine whether a hearing is necessary, litigation
which may consume more time and result in more expense to the
Government than would have been caused by holding the hearing.
Additionally, the granting of a fair and impartial hearing is likely
to further cooperative relationships between the Government and
industry, while the refusal to grant such a hearing can exacerbate
such relationships and generate the suspicion that an administrative
agency is acting arbitrarily. In fact, until the advent of the controversy surrounding Fair Packaging and Labeling Act regulations,
hearings had generally been liberally granted and very few disputes
had arisen concerning this matter. 95
0, Under the 1938 version of the Act, 52 Stat. 1055 (1938), a hearing was required
for all regulations and the later Hale Amendments were only intended to waive
hearings when everyone acquiesced in the proposed regulation. See text accompanying
notes 50-66 supra.
05 The only reported cases on this subject are Dyestuffs & Chems., Inc. v. Flemming,
271 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 911 (1960) (reviewed at text
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION

The denial of a hearing on the proposed regulations governing
labeling of foods under the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act raises
almost every conceivable legal question which could be raised under
section 701 (e) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. In
rejecting the requests for a public hearing, the FDA began with
those objections which stated that the regulations exceeded the
authority of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs. The Administration argued that these objections were without merit and that,
in any event, the objections did not properly raise any factual issues
which could be resolved through the public hearing procedure. 0 On
the latter point, at least, the FDA's reasoning seems correct, since
the objections raised purely a question of law which was not de97
pendent upon factual issues.
The same argument-that only an issue of law was raised-was
used to deny the requests for hearing based on other objections.
These objectors had stated that the name of the division of a corporation was sufficient for consumer protection and that the regulation
requiring the actual corporate name in addition to the divisional
accompanying notes 67-76 supra); and Cook Chocolate Co. v. Miller, 72 F. Supp. 573
(D.D.C. 1947) (reviewed at text accompanying notes 34-49 supra). Analogous
cases are Certified Color Indus. Comm. v. Secretary, 283 F.2d 622, 628 (2d Cir. 1960);
and United States v. 353 Cases of Mountain Valley Mineral Water, 247 F.2d 473, 480 (8th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 834 (1958). The limited number of cases on the
point bears witness to the lack of controversy between industry and the Secretary on
this question. The Mountain Valley Mineral Water case indicates an interesting,
although obvious, limitation on the right to a public hearing. The right to the
hearing lies under § 701 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371
(1964), but this right does not extend to interpretive regulations which do not have
the force and effect of law and are not promulgated pursuant to § 701. Id.: see Administratvie Procedure Act § 4 (b) (3) (A), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) (3) (A) (Supp. II, 1967).
16 See 32 Fed. Reg. 13276, 13277 (1967). One of the more interesting arguments
on the legal validity of the regulations was raised by the Carnation Company. Carnation's objections, dated August 21, 1967, argued that the FDA's promulgations under
the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act were invalid in their entirety. The company
noted that the Act, by express provision, did not become effective until July 1, 1967.
See Fair Packaging and Labeling Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 1461 (Supp. II 1967). The Act
also requires that proposed regulations be promulgated for comments and then republished for objections. Id. § 6 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1455 (a) (1964). The Commissioner of
Food and Drugs actually promulgated the regulations for comment on March 17, 1967.
32 Fed. Reg. 4172 (1967). Carnation reasoned that no one could properly promulgate
regulations under a statute which was not yet in effect. The company concluded
that since the regulations had never been properly published for comment, all subsequent proceedings were invalid.
07 See text accompanying notes 89-94 supra.
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name was unreasonable. 98 Reasoning that the actual name of the
corporation was required by the statute, the FDA rejected all requests for a public hearing on this issue. 9 However, it is arguable
that the Administration's theory that only a question of law was involved has less validity here than it had in meeting contentions that
statutory authority had been exceeded. While the statute directs
the FDA to promulgate regulations requiring the specification of
the name of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor on consumer
commodities, 100 there are two possible interpretations of the statute.
The first is that Congress in enacting the statute directed the FDA
to require the use of the actual corporate name on consumer commodities. The second is that Congress merely gave the FDA discretion to require the use of that name which was most meaningful
to consumers. If the latter interpretation is correct, the FDA should
have granted the public hearing and permitted testimony on questions such as whether divisional names have through usage become
more familiar to consumers than actual corporate names and whether
requiring actual corporate names would result in any great hardship
to those who had been using divisional names. Once these questions
had been resolved, the FDA would have discretion to determine
08 See Food Chemical News, Aug. 28, 1967, at 5. The American Bakers Association
objected that many corporations cannot use their actual corporate names in some
localities since other corporations have prior local rights to the use of such denominations. The Gorton Corporation was concerned with the difficulty of determining the
actual corporate names of the manufacturer when several subsidiaries participated in
production of the commodity but did not expressly demand a hearing. In the view
of the Carnation Company, the regulations were arbitrary and the scope of the Commissioner's authority should have been scrutinized in a public hearing. Additionally,
Sunkist Growers filed objections with the Hearing Clerk, dated August 17, 1967, on
a related issue. Sunkist, a cooperative marketing association, noting that the regulation would require its trademark licensees to place their names on the labels, contended that this was unreasonable because: (1) Sunkist set the specifications for the
product and, therefore, should be considered the manufacturer; (2) Sunkist, and not
its licensees, had the only name which had significance to consumers; and (3) the
regulation would cause economic waste by preventing group-buying of packages.
Sunkist demanded a public hearing on the issue: "Whether it is necessary or desirable
to require the identity of distributors or packers of trademark brand products which
are distributed pursuant to a franchise licensed contract."
00 See 32 Fed. Reg. 13276, 13277 (1967). Some of the objections and issues for a
public hearing on the corporate name requirement were technically imprecise. However, the Commissioner's denial of a public hearing did not rest on that theory. He
instead reasoned that the statute required the actual corporate name and that therefore the question of whether the corporate name was necessary could not be the
subject of the public hearing.
10' Fair Packaging and Labeling Act § 4 (a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 1453 (a) (1) (Supp. II,
1967).
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what names should be used.
Arguably, Congress intended the
FDA to exercise precisely this type of discretion, since the Senate
report on the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act stated that the regulations were to be promulgated insuring "adequate identification" of
the manufacturer. 10 2
Probably the two most serious challenges to the Commissioner's
regulations were objections to his specification of the lower thirty
percent of the label as the position for the net quantity declaration
and his choice of type size for the net quantity statement. With
regard to the lower thirty percent requirement, one company objected
that:
the proposed order is not based upon adequate evidence that it
would either promote consumer interest, improve consumer information, or enable consumers to obtain accurate information as
to the quantity of contents or facilitate value comparisons. 103
Restated, the objector's position was that the Commissioner's
order was not supported by substantial evidence. In addition, the
same objector queried whether sufficient facts established the top,
rather than the bottom, thirty percent of the label as the best location for the net quantity statement. 04
In denying the requests for a public hearing, the Commissioner
said that other locations could have been adopted for the net quantity
101 The FDA made the same type of argument-that it had no discretion and

therefore that only a legal issue was presented-in denying requests for a public hearing on its definition of the principal display panel of packages. See 32 Fed. Reg. 13277

(1967).

202 See S. RP. No. 1186, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (reprinted in 1966 U.S. CoDo
& AD. NEws 4069, 4070). The phrase "adequate identification" would seem to
imply that the regulations could require a denomination less than the actual corporate
name if another name were shown by the facts to be "adequate."
100See Objections of The Kroger Company, dated August 18, 1967, p. 1, on file
with the Hearing Clerk, 880 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C.
1oThe Kroger Company's objections raised three issues: "1. Whether or not there
axe sufficient facts to support the order's requirement that the net quantity of contents
statement be placed within the bottom 30% of the area of the label panel; 2. Whether
or not there are sufficient facts to establish that the order is consistent with the best
interests of the consumer in enabling the making of value comparisons in marketing;
8. Whether or not there are sufficient facts to establish that the consumer's ability
to obtain accurate information as to quantity of contents and to make value comparisons would be best facilitated by a requirement that the net quantity of contents
declaration be placed within the top 30% of the label panel." Id. at 2-3. Kroger offered
to show in support of its objections that substantial numbers of packages were now
labeled with their net contents in the upper 30% of the label and that price markings
were usually placed within the same area. Kroger reasoned that value comparisons
would be facilitated by placing the net quantity statement and price in closer proxCONG.

imity. Id.
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statement but that no location was agreeable to all parties. 10 5 He
further found that:
[a] public hearing as to the best location is not required, nor
would a hearing of opinions on other places where this information
might be placed change the situation. Such opinions have already
been presented to the Commissioner at great length. Since the
statute provides that the selection of the uniform location shall be
made by the Commissioner and not by popular vote, and since
no substantial objection to his selection has been offered, it is found
that there is no basis for a public hearing on this issue.106
This ruling raises several serious questions. While lengthy opinions
may have been presented to the Commissioner concerning the proper
location requirement, 10 7 none of those opinions would have been
sworn or considered competent evidence in any judicial proceeding,
and none were subject to cross-examination. If any factual issues
were raised by the objections, the Commissioner should have disregarded all of this ex parte evidence, held a public hearing, and
based his decision only on evidence of record at that hearing. 0 8 The
Commissioner's comment that the selection of the uniform location
was to be made by him and not by popular vote also seems to miss
the point. If objections were filed raising factual issues, the Commissioner should have made his selection only on the basis of evidence presented at a fair, impartial public hearing.10 9 Then, if
the Commissioner's selection of a location were reasonable, and supported by substantial evidence, it would be a proper selection even
if it were not the best selection. Finally, the Commissioner's ruling
that no substantial objection had been offered to the uniform location requirement seems completely erroneous. One of the objections
101532 Fed. Reg. 13277 (1967).
100
Id.

2o7The opinions presented to the Commissioner were merely informal statements of
the views of interested parties.
108Section 701 (e) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act makes clear that
when objections are raised, the informal views and comments are not evidence. The
statute states: "Such order shall be based only on substantial evidence of record
." 21 U.S.C. § 371 (e) (1964). The Food and Drug bar has
at such hearing ....

always regarded the right of cross-examination as vital to the fair resolution of factual
issues. See, e.g., Austern, The Future of Mandatory Food Standards, 9 FooD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 77, 84 (1954) (cross-examination is perhaps the best guarantee against
occasional or inadvertent arbitrary action); Markel, Proposed Simplification of Food
Standards Procedures, 8 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 227, 236 (1953) (formal examination
and cross-examination of witnesses has proved itself as one of the best, if not the
best, procedures to insure a democratic process in resolving disagreements formally).
100 See notes 21-32, 61-66, 107 supra.
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alleged that adequate factual evidence supported neither the Commissioner's regulation nor the view that the regulation would promote the purposes of the statute. Though the substantiality of this
objection would seem apparent, the Commissioner ignored it and
focused upon another issue raised by the same objector-that the
facts supported the contention that a location other than that chosen
by the Commissioner was best. No reason was given for the Commissioner's conclusion that an objection stating that a regulation is
not supported by adequate factual evidence is not substantial. 110
110Arguably, the Commissioner erred on at least one other objection. The objector challenged the requirement that packages bear the words "net weight." The Commissioner overruled the objection on the ground that the proponent had not suggested
alternative language. See 32 Fed. Reg. 13277 (1967). However, the objector had no
responsibility to draft a regulation supported by substantial evidence; such a function
was congressionally granted to the Commissioner.
Additionally, the Commissioner probably erred in ruling upon objections filed by
those corporations which also filed requests for exemption of their products from the
regulations. The apparent theory of this dual filing was that it gave full protection
of the companies' legal rights. In practice, it had no such effect. The Commissioner
noted in relation to the soft drink industry that "[s]everal objections involving the
labeling of nonalcoholic beverages sold in bottles closed by crowns were submitted
allegedly to protect the legal rights of the objectors in the event of the Commissioner
not acting favorably on certain requests for exemptions that were submitted at essentially the same time. The Commissioner will consider requests for exemptions supported by good and sufficient reasons. Thus, objections seeking special exemptions
in this category cannot be accepted as justifying a public hearing." 32 Fed. Reg. 13277
(1967). There is no statutory justification for denying objections and requests for a
public hearing merely because an exemption petition is also presented. Further, some
of the objectors raised legal issues which warranted a public hearing. See, e.g.,
Objections of the Coca Cola Company, dated July 21, 1967, on file with the Hearing
Clerk, 330 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. ("whether there was sufficient
evidence to justify § 1.8 (a) and § 1.8 (b) and the supporting Finding No. 3 ... dealing
with the placement of the statement of identity:)
The Commissioner's action also put those filing both exemption petitions and
objections at a procedural disadvantage. When objections are filed raising factual
issues, the Commissioner must grant a public hearing. See Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act §§ 701 (e) (2)- (3), 21 U.S.C. §§ 371 (e) (2)- (3) (1964). However, more than
factual issues must be shown to get a hearing on exemption petitions. The petitioner
must show: (1) a statement of facts supporting his petition, (2) that the petition is
reasonable, (3) that the proposal will not unduly impinge upon the consumer's right
to information, and (4) that full compliance with the law is impracticable or otherwise unnecessary. See Fair Packaging and Labeling Act Reg. § L.la (b), 32 Fed. Reg.
10730 (1967). Some persons who raised objections sufficient for a public hearing may,
therefore, be denied such a procedure because their exemption petitions do not meet
the detailed criteria of the Commissioner.
Even if all persons filing both objections and exemption petitions do ultimately
get a hearing on their exemption petitions, this will not be equivalent to a hearing on
objections. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the burden of proof rests upon
the proponent of a rule or order. See Administrative Procedure Act § 7 (c), 5 U.S.C.
§ 556 (c) (Supp. II 1967). See also 21 C.F.R. § 2.63 (Supp. 1967). The Commissioner
would therefore have had the burden at all hearings on objections, while the objecting
petitioners would have that responsibility at all hearings on exemptions.
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Objections to the Commissioner's choice of type sizes were
treated in a similar manner. One objector alleged that the type size
established for packages having a principal display panel of twentyfive to thirty-five square inches was arbitrary and unreasonable."1
The Commissioner reasoned that whatever type sizes were chosen,
some persons would find them objectionable. He therefore concluded that this was a matter that the Commissioner had to decide,
and not one warranting a public hearing." 2 Again the same fallacy
exists in his reasoning. Though the Commissioner must decide the
content of all regulations, the statute requires that when factual
issues are raised, he make that decision only after a public hearing.
Finally, in a belated attempt to avoid a public hearing, the Com3
missioner made some minor amendments to his final regulations"
which tended to be favorable to industry." 4 However, consumers,
as well as producers, have legal standing under the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act." 5 In modifying final regulations, both
consumers and producers were deprived of an opportunity to object
to the changes and seek a public hearing."16 Although the changes
The most appropriate procedure under the circumstances would seem to have
been for the Commissioner to proceed to a hearing on the proposed exemptions and to
hold a decision on objections in abeyance pending resolution of the exemption requests. If the exemptions were granted, the petitioners would no longer be persons
adversely affected by the order and their objections could be dismissed. If the exemptions were denied, these objections, together with all others raising factual issues, would
be entitled to a further hearing; but the prior record on the exemption petitions could
be received into evidence, thus satisfying the Commissioner's desire to avoid unnecessary duplication of evidence.
LSee Objections of the Carnation Company, dated August 21, 1967, on file with the
Hearing Clerk, 330 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. The regulation
prescribed type sizes for packages having a label area of 25 to 100 square inches. Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act Reg. § 1.8b (i) (3), 32 Fed. Reg. 10732 (1967). The Carnation Company, noting that this encompassed a large category of labels, suggested that
lesser type sizes would suffice for packages having a label area of 25 to 35 square inches.
Carnation said, "To be sure, some arbitrary point must be selected at which the content declaration type size must be moved up a notch. Our complaint is that the
point given in § 1.8 (b) (i) (2)- (3) is not reasonable . . . . The regulation, then, is
arbitrary and unreasonable." Objections of the Carnation Company, supra at 6-7.
112 82 Fed. Reg. 13277 (1967).
11s Id. at 13277-78.
114 Alterations were made primarily to meet industry objections. These changes
included allowance of additional time for adding Zip Codes to labels of consumer
packages, re-definition of the principal display panel of odd-shaped containers, and
exclusion of declarations of numerical count from the servings category. Also, the
requirement that dilution directions be placed on the principal display panel of the
package was made optional rather than mandatory. Id.
Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953), noted in Baird, Right of
1ee
judicial Review, 10 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 285 (1955).
116A collateral problem under the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act regulations
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were not significant, the approach followed by the Commissioner in
making them was without statutory authorization.
CONCLUSION

The objections filed to the regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Food and Drugs under the Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act posed difficult questions concerning the necessity for a public
hearing pursuant to section 701 (e) of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act. However, as the foregoing analysis indicates, there
can be little doubt that the Commissioner erred in uniformly denying all requests for a public hearing on his controversial labeling
117
regulations.
raised vestiges of Cook Chocolate Co. v. Miller. See text accompanying notes 34-39
supra. The National Canners Association filed a petition for exemption of smaller
containers from the FPLA regulations. The Commissioner replied that the petition
did not set forth reasonable grounds and, therefore, that publication of the petition
as a proposed regulation was not warranted. See Food Chemical News, Oct. 2, 1967,
at 8.
Additionally some objections were filed to a statement of policy promulgated by
the Commissioner dealing with inventory of packages. These objections were apparently
denied because they raised only an issue of law and because statements of policy are
not subject to objections. See 32 Fed. Reg. 13277 (1967); cf. United States v. 353
Cases of Mountain Valley Mineral Water, 247 F.2d 473, 480 (8th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 834 (1958).
117 At the Food and Drug Law Institute-Food and Drug Administration Educational Conference-held in Washington, D.C., on November 27, 1967, a Food and Drug
Administration official suggested that the Commissioner's refusal to hold a public hearing might be justified by FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964). Considering rulemaking under the Natural Gas Act, the Texaco Court held that it was sufficient to
permit interested parties to express their views in writing rather than in an oral
hearing. The official suggested that the same philosophy applied to the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and, therefore, that the opportunity to submit written
views satisfied statutory requirements. It should be noted, however, that the Commissioner himself did not rely upon this rationale in denying objections. In his denial lie
merely said that "none of the objections . . . warrant . . . holding of a public
32
3..."Fed. Reg. 13277 (1967). The implication that the consideration of
hearing .
written comments and objections was a "hearing" is thus contrary to the stated reasoning of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs. More importantly, the equation of a
hearing with written submission is inherently inconsistent with the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act § 701, 21 U.S.C. § 371 (1964). Section 701 (e) (1) provides that the proposed regulation will be published and that all interested persons will be given an
opportunity to comment orally or in writing on the proposed regulation. The Secretary
is then to consider the comments and republish the proposed regulation. 21 U.S.C.
§ 371 (e) (1) (1964). Sections 701 (e) (2)- (3) provide that persons adversely affected can
file objections and demand a public hearing and that "the Secretary, after due notice,
shall hold such a public hearing for the purpose of receiving evidence relevant and
material to the issues raised by such objections. At the hearing, any interested person
may be heard in person or by representative." Id. § 371 (e) (3). It is thus clear that
after the filing of objections, interested persons must be given an opportunity to present evidence and be heard. Finally, any dispute about the type of hearing required by
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Whenever a public hearing is required, it is to ensure that the
administrative agency responsible for rule-making under the particular act listens to all of the relevant evidence and specifies the finding
of facts iinderlying its regulations. A possibility always exists that
the additional evidence presented at a public hearing may lead to
significant improvements in the agency's proposed regulations.
Even where improvement seems unlikely, a compatible working
relationship between government and industry necessarily depends
upon a mutual respect for the rule of law. While it may be argued
that the failure to hold a public hearing on proposed administrative
regulations is expedient, since it avoids delay," 8 expediency of this
type is not without its costs. Both the public interest and the rule
of law suffer when an administrative agency ignores the statutory
right to a public hearing on its proposed regulations.
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act can be resolved by reviewing its legislative
history which makes plain that an oral hearing with the right of cross-examination was
intended. See text accompanying notes 21-27 supra. Until the controversy over Fair
Packaging and Labeling, the Food and Drug Administration itself consistently interpreted § 701 as requiring an oral hearing. Since there has been no amendment to the
Act justifying a different interpretation, the consistent and long-standing interpretation
of the FDA would seem to be entitled to great weight in determining the proper construction of the statute. Cf. United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 96 (1956).
"Is The expediency argument was raised by Food Chemical News, Sept. 18, 1967, at
9, when it stated: "The history of the FPLA food regulations assures Commissioner
Goddard of good grades in President Johnson's course in achieving consensus. Despite
the great number of adverse comments, and later of objections, to the regulations, FDA
has managed to publish, republish, and make effective highly controversial regulations. This has been done rapidly. The luster of this politically desirable accomplishment would have been dimmed if a public hearing had been deemed to be necessary."

